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Abstract:  
The paper provides a cost benefit analysis of one of the most prominent deployment 
project in France of fuel cell electric vehicles, taking place in Normandy. The project builds 
on the substitution of a diesel Renault Kangoo by an electric Renault Kangoo ZE with a 
fuel cell range extender for public fleets. The analysis points out potential weaknesses of 
the project as it is envisioned today using a decomposition of the value-chain. To achieve 
sustainability in 2025 a much stronger deployment should take place. This would allow for 
a sharp decrease in the total cost of ownership thanks to a close coordination between 
hydrogen production and its delivery through refilling stations to take advantage of the 
expected increasing volume of hydrogen consumption along the deployment path. This 
suggests that a high level in public funds at this early deployment phase can be critical for 
the success of the project. 
JEL classification: D04, H54, L91, Q55 
Key words: fuel cell electric vehicles, cost benefit analysis, public policies, infrastructure 
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1. Introduction 
 
A number of studies suggest that the deployment of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV) will 
increase at a modest rate until 2030 at best (McKinsey & Company, 2010; Rösler, van der 
Zwaan, Keppo and Bruggink, 2014; Zachmann, Holtermann, Radeke, Tam, Huberty, 
Naumenko and Faye, 2012; Oshiro and Masui, 2014). Indeed the current deployment of 
FCEV remains in its infancy relative to BEV (Tietge, Mock, Lutsey, and Campestrini, 2016). 
Still some early FCEV deployments are taking place in various countries (Brunet, 
Kotelnikova and Ponssard, 2015). The Normandy project is the most prominent one in 
France. This paper provides an assessment of this project.   
The geographical deployment of battery electric vehicles (BEV) proceeds through clusters 
in large suburban areas, and then expects to expand through corridors that would 
connect these clusters. This is bound to be even more so for the deployment of FCEV for 
three reasons: (i) the potential regional markets will be initially low because of the high 
price of the vehicle,2 (ii) this means many regional markets will be required to achieve a 
minimum efficient size for vehicle manufacturing, (ii) on each regional market the 
infrastructure will require large investments with low profitability in a hydrogen 
distribution network due to the initial low volumes of H2 consumption. On the contrary, 
in countries with a well-developed electrical network, the cost of BEV terminals is 
relatively low. There is no need for specialized maintenance.  
These considerations points out the complementarity of direct and indirect consumer 
subsidies with infrastructure subsidies has been the key driver for the deployment of 
BEV,3 Norway being the ideal case study (Tietge, Mock, Lutsey, and Campestrini, 2016). 
The analysis of the Normandy project provides an opportunity to see how these general 
considerations are at work and the role of public policies in the deployment. In Normandy 
a voluntary hydrogen plan has been designed and gained large political support. In terms 
of FCEV it builds on the substitution of a diesel Kangoo by an electric Kangoo ZE with a 
fuel cell range extender for public fleets. This hybrid solution delivers a vehicle with a 
range of 300 km (instead of 120km for the battery electric Kangoo ZE) for a lower cost 
than a full hydrogen vehicle.  The whole value chain is reviewed in details: the hydrogen 
production cost by electrolysis or SMR, the distribution and the delivery costs of 
hydrogen, the manufacturing and running cost of the hydrogen Kangoo. The total cost of 
                                                             
2 The price of the Toyota Mirai is around k€66 in Europe.  
3 This is known as the chicken-egg-dilemma. On the one hand, vehicles manufacturers need refilling stations to 
attract consumers and, on the other hand, infrastructure builders need vehicles. This chicken and egg situation 
would typically be solved through vertical integration (see for instance Bresahan and Levin, 2012). When the 
players are in different industries, such as it is the case for FCEV, vertical integration is unlikely to occur, 
inducing a delay in simultaneous investments. 
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ownership (TCO) is compared with the cost of the corresponding diesel vehicle. The 
amplitude of the public policies that results from this analysis, i.e. how much consumer 
incentives and infrastructure subsidies would be needed to make the TCO’s comparable, 
is compared to the amplitude of existing policies. Measuring the gap at the 2025 horizon 
provides an interesting assessment for the potential success of the Normandy project, i.e. 
what are the chances that it will turn into a self-sustainable project or that it will remain 
highly dependent on political support. It is shown that, in the scenario envisioned today, 
the gap is quite substantial. A number of suggestions are made to alleviate this gap. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background for the Normandy 
project. The cost benefit analysis is carried out in section 3. This section provides the 
methodology, the main hypotheses, data sources, and details our results. Section 4 draws 
the implications in terms of sustainability of the project and the amplitude of the public 
support to achieve this sustainability. Section 5 concludes and suggests some further 
research.  
2. The Normandy project  
   
2.1 Normandy and the appealing factors for a Hydrogen Plan 
The most ambitious project concerning hydrogen for mobility in France is the Normandy 
project. This project aims to install the utilization of hydrogen for a long term on the 
territory. The Manche department, which has some specificity, initiated it: the production 
of electricity is much larger than its consumption, and the difference is expected to grow 
further, moreover this electricity production is carbon free. There are currently two 
nuclear plants (REP) which produce 18TWh per year and a wind farm (0,2TWh). Two new 
nuclear plants are planned for 2017 and 2035 for an additional production of 13TWh by 
2050. This area also presents a high potential for renewable energy sources (RES) from 
wind power (offshore and onshore) and from sea power (wave and sea flows). More than 
24 TWh could be potentially produced by 2050 by RES. The Manche consumption is 
currently estimated at 14TWh per year. It will probably decrease with the energies 
efficiencies targets. Despite of the high electricity overproduction, Normandy imports 9 
TWh of fossil resources for transport and heating. 
In this context, the hydrogen solution has some appeal. Firstly, it decreases the import bill 
of fossil fuel and indirectly decreases the greenhouse gas emission. Secondly, instead of 
directly exporting the electricity overproduction, the production of hydrogen by 
electrolysis allows adding a value on the final product. Indeed, hydrogen may be used in 
several downstream markets including chemicals (such as methanol) and transport. It is 
also a possible way to store electricity produced by renewables. The development of the 
hydrogen energy vector is expected to increase local employment and attract highly 
qualified workers.  
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The project has gained much political support and been extended from the Manche 
department to the whole Normandy region. 
2.2 The Hydrogen Normandy FCEV Project (EasHyMob) 
The Normandy project is known as the EasHyMob project.4 The project is coordinated by 
Symbiofcell, Normandy Region and Serfim. It covers the 2016-2018 time horizon. 
Symbiofcell is a private company that designs and produces kits to extend autonomy of 
full electric vehicles. The project has been built with the support of EHD2020 which is an 
association founded under the hospices of the Council of the Manche department that 
gathers more than 40 members including industrial companies, local counties and 
universities to promote the hydrogen plan in Normandy.5 The project received the 
support of the European Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA).6 INEA 
allocated M€5 subsidy with a target deployment of 15 HRS of 350 bar with a capacity 
between 20 kg/day and 50 kg/day. Only public entities are eligible for these subsidies. 
Another constraint imposed by INEA concerns the location of the stations. They need to 
be close to the highways and that at least 15 hydrogen vehicles be on roads at the 
opening of a station. 
At the end of 2014 a first hydrogen refilling station (HRS) 350 bar of 40kg/day had been 
installed to initiate the deployment of hydrogen vehicles. In 2016, there were 17 
hydrogen vehicles on roads, of which 12 Hydrogen Kangoo and 5 Hyundai ix35 FCell. The 
HRS station can feed between 50 and 100 light duty vehicles (Hydrogen Kangoo), 
somewhat less full power vehicles as Hyundai ix25 FCell. 
2.3 The Hydrogen Kangoo  
The Hydrogen Kangoo is a BEV Kangoo ZE with a fuel cell range extender. The hydrogen 
device is composed of a fuel cell of 5kW and a tank of 1.8 kg of H2 under 350 bar. The 
lithium ion batteries give a range of 120km and the hydrogen kit an extra 180km, so that 
a total range of 300km is available in urban cycle. The power of the fuel cell is low; it is 
used is to recharge the battery to increase the range.  
SymbioFCell produces the fuel cell, Michelin (IMeca) assembles the hydrogen kit (fuel cell, 
tank, converter, etc.) and Renault (Renault Tech) installs the device on the Kangoo ZE. The 
deployment began at the end of 2014; in 2016, there were around 70 Hydrogen Kangoo 
on French roads. 
                                                             
4 (http://www.ehd2020.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Presentation-EAS-HyMob-16-July-2015.pdf). 
5 http://www.ehd2020.com/les-membres/  
6 INEA is the successor of the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA). One of the 
missions of INEA is to ensure the cohesion, interconnection and interoperability of the trans-European 
transport network.  
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The cost of the Hydrogen Kangoo is k€36,3 (VAT excl.): k€19.2 for the Kangoo ZE and k€17 
for the hydrogen kit. In France, an ecological bonus of k€6,3 is allocated to such a green 
vehicle so that the purchasing net price is at k€30.   
A version of Hydrogen Kangoo with a tank under 700 bar is now available and begins to 
be deployed in UK, Germany and North European Countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). 
3. A cost benefit analysis of the Normandy project 
 
3.1 Methodology, main hypotheses and data sources 
 
Our cost benefit analysis of the Normandy project builds on the following methodology 
and main hypotheses: 
- The cornerstone of the project is the substitution of a Diesel Kangoo (noted as D-
K) by a Hydrogen Kangoo (to be denoted as H2-K) for a number of public fleets; 
- The whole value chain of this substitution is reviewed in details:  the hydrogen 
production, the distribution and the delivery of hydrogen, the manufacturing of 
the H2-K; 
- The time horizon goes up to 2025, close enough to be meaningful for policy 
analysis and far away enough to assess the potential success of the project; 
- Two scenarios are investigated: scenario 1 reflecting a moderate success under 
which the project would still rely on public subsidies and scenario 2 reflecting a full 
success under which the project becomes self-profitable; the initial position in 
2016 is also modelled as a reference; 
- The occurrence of each scenario depends on the internal deployment of the H2-K 
in Normandy but also on how successful the whole deployment of FCEV in France 
and possibly elsewhere in Europe takes place; we identify the main critical 
interfaces of this dependence; 
- For each scenario our objective is to identify the total cost of ownership of both 
vehicles and the corresponding carbon abatement cost in 2025; then to use these 
results to assess the potential amplitude of public policies at that horizon and 
their optimal combination. 
 
The data is coming mostly from interviews of the different actors of the Normandy 
project:  
- For the characteristics of the Hydrogen Kangoo and the projections of its 
deployment in Normandy: SymbioFCell, EHD2020. 
- For the characteristics of the electrolysis technologies and of the hydrogen retail 
stations:  Air Liquide, GNVert, Keolis, Siemens, Areva H2gen, SERFIM, Tenerrdis, 
EHD2020, FCH-JU. 
- For estimates of the electricity prices: RTE and EDF publications. 
- For the scenarios: scenario 1 is based on the Actis bee study extended to the 
whole region, scenario 2 should be considered as our own construction to achieve 
sustainability in 2025 
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3.2 The scenarios 
 
The scenarios are described Table 1. For each scenario estimates of the total park (sedan, 
utility, trucks, coaches ...), the penetration rate of H2 within the total park, and the 
number of H2-K are given. From these estimates the H2 consumption can be derived as 
well as the corresponding elements of the value chain: H2 production, retail stations 
(HRS), logistics. Table 1 gives the optimal design along the value chain for each scenario: 
how and where the hydrogen is produced (centralized or 1 or several sites, eventually on 
site at the hydrogen retail station), how it is delivered to the retail stations in case of 
centralized production.7 It is assumed that electrolysis production of H2 is fully 
implemented in 2025 while in 2016 H2 is still obtained through the steam reforming 
process (SMR).  
 
Table 1: The scenarios, the associated value chain and the cost benefit analysis 
 
   2016 2025 
     unit Current situation Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Vehicles 
Hydrogen fleet  # 50 5 000 10 000 
Penetration rate % 0,003% 0,261% 0,521% 
of which H2-K  # 40 2 000 4 000 
Penetration rate in light 
duty vehicles 
% 0,013% 0,67% 1,34% 
Production 
Production technology "" SMR Electrolysis Electrolysis 
H2 production process "" Centralised Centralised on 2 
sites 
on-site 
Distribution 
HRS capacity kg/j 20 100 400 
Nb of HRS # 5 50 25 
HRS utilization rate % 50% 80% 100% 
storage "" gas bottle Tube Trailer NC 
 
 
The scenario for 2016 corresponds to the deployment scheduled in the EasHyMob project 
for the end of 2016. The hydrogen is produced by Steam Methane Reforming in refinery. 
This system is centralized with a distance refinery-station of average 200km. The 
hydrogen is stored in gas bottle under 220 bar and delivered by trucks. The utilization rate 
of the retail stations is of 50%.  
 
Scenario 1 should be considered as the most probable continuation of the EasHyMob 
project. It assumes that the project is fully realized in 2018 and continues on the same 
trend until 2025. The hydrogen is produced in two high powered electrolysers and the 
average distance electrolyser-station is 100 km. Hydrogen is stored on the station in 400 
kg tube trailers. The utilization rate of the retail stations is of 80%. 
 
Scenario 2 is our construction and should be considered as a sustainable target. The 
scenario assumes that EasHyMob project is fully realized in 2018 and accelerates in the 
following years. The hydrogen is produced on-site by electrolysis. The utilization rate on 
the retail stations is of 100%. Altogether the carbon abatement cost of this scenario has 
to be in line with a reasonable carbon price.   
                                                             
7 The detailed calculation that leads to the optimal design can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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For each scenario we shall establish a total cost of ownership in €/km adding the various 
cost components along the value chain. All costs are in € 2016 and no inflation is 
introduced. Capital expenditures will generate yearly expenses using an annual discount 
rate taken at 6%. Introducing the total cost of ownership for the D-K and its CO2 
emissions per km allows for deriving the implicit carbon abatement cost. This remains a 
static analysis and a more detailed dynamic analysis would certainly been worthwhile. 
Still the figures we obtain give an idea of the cost benefit of the substitution of the H2-K 
versus the D-K.  
 
3.3 The H2 electrolysis production cost in 2025  
 
The main differences between the two scenarios may come from three factors:  
- A higher power needed for centralized than for decentralized on site production; 
- A lower utilization rate for scenario 1 than for scenario 2; 
- A lower electricity price with centralized than for decentralized production.  
Table 2 gives the detailed calculation to arrive at the hydrogen production by kg. 8  The 
first factor does not make much difference since in both cases the size of the electrolyser 
is high enough to allow for substantial economies of scale. A capex of 500 /Kw is assumed 
in both cases, based on the proton exchange membrane (PEM) technology. The second 
factor makes scenario 1 somewhat more costly than scenario 2 but this is overbalanced 
by the third factor that is the lower price of electricity in scenario 1. The rationale for this 
lower price comes under our assumption that the network fees are not supported in 
scenario 1 since the electrolysis sites would be connected directly to the production of 
carbon free electricity, which is more difficult to be achieved when hydrogen production 
is located in retail stations. It is assumed that both electricity prices exclude the CSPE 
(Contribution au service public de l'électricité).9  
Altogether it turns out that there is no significant difference in the unit cost of 
production. However we shall see shortly that the mode of production has a major impact 
on the delivery cost.  
 
 
 
                                                             
8 In all Tables numbers in italic are obtained from the raw data reported in regular characters.  
9 This consumer tax compensates the electricity producers for the constraints imposed by the regulator such as 
buying back electricity produced through renewables at feed-in tariffs or providing electricity to low income 
households. Some consumers such as production of hydrogen through electrolysis have been granted exclusion 
for the tax. “https://www.edf.fr/entreprises/le-mag/actualites-du-marche-de-l-energie/evolution-de-la-
contribution-au-service-public-de-l-electricite-cspe-au-1er-janvier-2016” 
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Table 2: The production cost of hydrogen in both scenarios 
Simplified data sheet unit scenario 1 scenario 2
HRS capacity kg/day 100 400
Nb HRS # 50                   1                             
daily working period h/day 12                   12                           
Process efficiency % 76                   76                           
Whole installation efficiency % 72                   72                           
equivalent hydrogen energy Kwh 39                   39                           
electricity needed by kg of hydrogen Kwh/kgH2 54                  54                          
Installation power needed Kw 11 280          1 810                     
Unit cost €/kW 500                500                         
Capex of electrolyzer k€ 5 640            905                        
Installation and grid connection %Capex 10                   10                           
Storage infrastructure Capex €/kg of capacity 500                500                         
Opex of electrolyzer %Capex 3,5                 3,5                          
lifetime years 15                   15                           
utilization rate % 80% 100%
annual production kg/year 730 000        146 000                
electricity price €/Mwh 50 65
hydrogen production cost €/kg H2 4,0 4,5
PEM
 
3.4 Distribution network and logistics  
 
The number and capacities of the HRS depend on the scenario, which also determines the 
number of production sites hence the distribution network. Table 3 provides both the 
cost of a HRS for each scenario and the associated transportation cost to deliver H2 to the 
HRS network. The overall network average cost per unit of hydrogen consumed appears 
extremely high in 2016, because of low volumes. For scenario 1 the average cost is still 
significant so that the amplitude of public financing of the network remains an important 
question to study.  For the scenario 2, the use of on-site production eliminates the 
transportation cost and thanks to the high consumption volume, the cost of the refilling 
station is low. 
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Table 3: The logistic cost of hydrogen in both scenarios 
 
Logistics 2016
Retail station scenario 1 scenario 2
capacity kg/day 20               100              400                
Capex k€ 200             150              1 000             
Opex %Capex 6% 4% 4%
installation %Capex 10% 10% 10%
lifetime years 15 20 20
utilization rate % 50% 80% 100%
H2 delivered kg/yr 3 650         29 200        146 000        
HRS cost €/kg 9,1 0,3 0,9
HRS utilization rate
Hydrogen storage gas bottles tube trailer on site
Rentale rate for storage €/month 70 1 700           NC 
subcontracting cost for transport €/km 1,2 2
Delivery distance km 200 100
HRS capacity kg/j 20 100
Utilization rate % 50% 80%
Quantity delivered / Trucks kg 50 400
Transport cost €/kg 10,7 4,4 0
2025
 
 
 
3.5 The total cost of ownership and the implicit carbon abatement cost 
 
To complete the cost benefit analysis one needs to introduce the manufacturing cost of 
the H2-K, the lifetime of a vehicle, the number of kilometres it runs per year and the 
fraction of which it operates on the fuel cell extender. This is done in Table 4. In this Table 
similar assumptions are also introduced concerning the D-K (manufacturing cost, fuel 
efficiency and diesel price).  
  
These values allow for the derivation of the total cost of ownership (TCO) and the 
calculation of the implicit carbon abatement cost. For scenario 1 the abatement cost is 
estimated to be 536 €/tCO2 which is much higher than the normative cost of carbon 
suggested by economic studies (see for instance Quinet 2013). This should not lead to a 
negative appraisal of the Normandy project as long as one considers that a full 
deployment could be achieved some years later. For instance one could interpret 
scenario 2 as the projection of scenario 1 in 2030. Since scenario 2 delivers an almost 
sustainable assessment of the project (with a 100 €/tCO2 in 2030 as proposed in Quinet 
2013), the static abatement cost obtained for 2025 of the deployment trajectory 
corresponding to scenario 1 should be taken as an intermediary result that does not 
reflect the full benefit of the scenario.10  
                                                             
10 The interested reader is referred to Creti, Kotelnikova, Meunier and Ponssard (2015) for a 
methodology to derive a relevant proxy of the abatement cost in the case of a progressive 
deployment of a green technology. One could expect that this proxy would generate a lower 
10 
 
 
Table 4 : The cost benefit analysis of the H2-K relative to the D-K.  
 
Simplified data Sheet Unit 2016
Scenarios # 1 2
Annual driving distance 1000km/yr
lifetime yr
Manufacturing cost
k€ 36,3 31,3 22
€/km 0,18 0,15 0,11
k€
€/km 0,05 0,05 0,05
Yearly Maintenance cost
k€/year
€/km 0,02 0,02 0,02
€/month 90 50 30
€/km 0,03 0,02 0,01
k€/year
€/km 0,03 0,03 0,03
Vehicle cost
Hydrogen Kangoo 0,23 0,19 0,14
Diesel Kangoo 0,08 0,08 0,08
Fuel Cost
Hydrogen Kangoo
Hydrogen production cost €/kg 1,5 4,0 4,5
station distribution cost €/kg 9,1 0,3 0,9
Transport cost €/kg 10,7 4,4 0,0
Hydrogen Delivery cost €/kg 21,3 8,7 5,4
Hydrogen kangoo consumption kgH2/100km 1 1 1
Range done by Hydrogen km 180 180 180
Electricity Consumption Kwh/100km 18,3 18,3 18,3
Range done by electricity km 120 120 120
€/100km 13,54 5,93 3,58
€/km 0,14 0,06 0,04
Diesel Kangoo
Diesel cost €/L 1 1,1 1,2
Diesel consumption L/100km 7 6,65 6,3
€/100km 7 7,315 7,56
€/km 0,07 0,07 0,08
Total Cost of Ownership
TCO Hydrogen kangoo €/km 0,36 0,25 0,17
TCO Diesel kangoo €/km 0,15 0,15 0,15
CO2 emissions
Hydrogen Kangoo kgCO2/100km 5,9 0 0
Diesel Kangoo kgCO2/100km 18,90 17,96 17,01
Carbon abatement cost €/tC02 1 647         536 108
2025
35
7
Hydrogen kangoo purchase cost
Diesel kangoo purchase 10
Hydrogen kangoo 0,7
Rental fee of the battery
Diesel model 1
Fuel cost hydrogen kangoo
Fuel cost Diesel kangoo
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
abatement than 536 €/tCO2 since at this date one could still expect a significant decline in the TCO of 
the H2-K if scenario 1 converges to scenario 2 in 2030. This methodology cannot be directly applied 
here since we have not modelled the deployment trajectory from 2016 to 2030.  
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Our analysis of the value chain decomposition allows for a quantification of its different 
components and provides an important result. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, for the H2-K 
user, the two main sources of cost are the vehicle cost (Capex stands for yearly equivalent 
investment cost and Maintenance for maintenance of the vehicle) and the fuel cost. Both 
of these sources are expected to significantly decrease but the order of their magnitude 
will change. As one goes from 2016 to scenario 1 and scenario 2 learning by doing and 
spill overs should explain the decrease in the vehicle cost.11 This will depend on the 
Normandy project but also, and probably more, on what happens to the deployment of 
the Hydrogen Kangoo and its fuel cell components at the European level.  As for the fuel 
cost our analysis points out that the decrease in cost results from the much higher 
volume of hydrogen consumption in scenario 2 and the corresponding joint optimization 
between production and networking. This suggests that a close coordination is required 
to optimize along the value chain to translate the progressive increase in consumption 
into cost benefits through on site production. In terms of amplitude, as long as the 
coordination is efficient, the decrease in the fuel cost is more significant than the 
decrease of the vehicle cost that is 75% versus 40%. While the two components are 
almost of the same order of magnitude in 2016, in scenario 2, the vehicle cost is now 
about three times more costly than the fuel cost.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: H2-K TCO decomposition 
                                                             
11 See for instance Schoots, Kramer and van der Zwaan (2010) for an analysis of learning by doing in 
FCEV. 
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Figure 2: Hydrogen cost decomposition 
 
4. Discussion: how to achieve sustainability for the Normandy project 
 
This cost benefit analysis provides interesting insights for the design of policies to 
promote the deployment of H2-K in Normandy. It allows for a quantification of the global 
amplitude of the public support that the project would still require in 2025, through a 
comparison between scenario 1 and scenario 2 taken as a target for sustainability.  
 
We construct a target policy for scenario 1 in 2025 such that the TCO for the H2-K would 
be equal to the TCO for scenario 2. More precisely we assume that a difference of 
approximately 650 €/year (the difference in TCOs times the km/year) for a public fleet 
user of a H2-K relative to a D-K is acceptable given its indirect ecological benefits on top of 
a carbon abatement cost of the order of 100 €/tCO2. Table 5 describes this target policy. 
It is based on a subsidy of the infrastructure cost in line with the level of current subsidies 
that is at 70% of the incurred capital costs. Then the rebate on the vehicle price is 
derived; we can see that a substantial rebate of k€12 is required. The unit subsidies are 
translated into a yearly average amount that takes into account the lifetime of each 
component; this gives approximately M€11 per year. This gives an idea of the total yearly 
budget that should be obtained at the regional, national and EU levels.   
 
Table 5: the target public policy 
 
0,18
0,15
0,11
0,02
0,02
0,02
0,03
0,02
0,01
0,14
0,06
0,04
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
0,40
2016 2025-scenario 1 2025-scenario 2
TC
O
 (€
/k
m
) Fuel cost
Battery rental
Maintenance
CAPEX
13 
 
Target subsidies full unit cost € € or % subsidy per unit # of units average subsidy k€/year
Rebate on vehicle 31 300                 12 000                                   5 000          10 140                                     
Electrolyser capex 5 640                    70% 2                  767                                           
HRS capex 150                       70% 50               432                                           
Transport cost (rental truck) 1,7                        70% 72               86                                             
total subsidies 11 424                                     
 
 
We may now compare the target policy with the current subsidies that have been 
obtained in 2016. Today, there are several organizations supporting the FCEV Deployment 
in France by investing in HRS (FCH-JU, Ademe, Feder, INEA) and vehicles (FCH-JU, France, 
Ademe). Assuming that these subsidies would be expended to 2025 at the same level (i.e. 
remain identical in percentage values) we may simulate their impact on the TCO. They 
would translate into a 6 300 rebate for the vehicle cost and a 70% rebate on the capex of 
HRS. Table 6 synthesizes such a policy. The annual yearly subsidy would be at M€5.7 that 
is approximately half our target budget. With such a subsidy the annual over cost of a H2-
K would be €2300, which is substantial. The annual yearly subsidy should also be 
compared with the subsidy obtained by the project for 2016-2018 namely k€850.  Our 
hypothesis that subsidies would remain constant up to 2025 is highly questionable.  
 
Table 6: An extrapolation of the current policy for 2025 
 
Target subsidies full unit cost € € or % subsidy per unit # of units average subsidy k€/year
Rebate on vehicle 31 300                 6 300                                     5 000          5 323                                       
Electrolyser capex 5 640                    2                  -                                            
HRS capex 150                       70% 50               432                                           
Transport cost (rental truck) 1,7                        72               -                                            
total subsidies 5 755                                       
 
 
Altogether we consider that the gap between our target policy and the current policy is 
quite large. This suggests that the Normandy project will remain dependent on the 
regional and national political support for the coming years unless circumstances are such 
that scenario 2 materialize in 2025.  
 
5. Concluding comments and suggestions for further research 
 
Our analysis of the deployment of the Normandy project delivers several important 
results. We modeled the situation in 2016, made projections for 2025 based on current 
assessments and constructed a target scenario for which sustainability is achieved 
(sustainability being defined as delivering an implicit carbon abatement cost of 100€/t 
CO2). This scenario could possibly be obtained in Normandy in 2030 or earlier if 
circumstances are highly favorable. According to our cost benefit analysis the TCO of the 
Hydrogen Kangoo would need to be reduced by a half along this path. Through a detailed 
examination of the value chain we showed that there are two requirements to achieve 
this goal.  
 
The first requirement assumes a significant level of learning by doing and spill overs in the 
manufacturing of the Hydrogen Kangoo to allow for a 40% decline of the purchase price 
of the Hydrogen Kangoo vehicle. This can only be consistent with a success of FCEV 
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deployment in two dimensions: (i) geographic that is not only in Normandy but all 
through Europe, (ii) across an extended line of H2 vehicles that is not only for Kangoo but 
also through sedan, buses and trucks so that altogether a large increase of the hydrogen 
volume of consumption is generated in Normandy. The initial network should be viewed 
in this perspective. To achieve this objective, high power vehicles (buses, trucks...) have 
an important role to play. 12  
 
The second requirement concerns a close coordination between hydrogen production 
and its delivery through refilling stations to take advantage of the increased volume of 
hydrogen consumption and manage the progressive substitution of steam methane 
reforming (SMR) by electrolysis. More specifically we evaluated the two optimal designs 
(associated with centralized production versus on site production) that should constitute 
the successive stages of the optimal path for infrastructure. A successful coordination 
strategy would allow for a 75% decrease of the hydrogen fuel cost.  
 
We then compared our sustainable target with the most probable scenario for 2025 and 
calculated the amplitude of public support that would be needed to make affordable the 
deployment of Hydrogen Kangoo for consumers. Assuming that a difference of 650 € per 
year would value the indirect benefits we showed that there is a substantial gap between 
the required level of subsidies and the subsidies obtained for years 2016-2018. This 
suggests that a strong political support for the Normandy project is needed for a much 
longer period.  
 
Our analysis points out further that while the level of subsidies for infrastructure is much 
less important than the level of direct subsidies for consumers the path followed in the 
infrastructure deployment can be critical to achieve sustainability. This calls for some 
questions as regards the options followed by the Normandy project: the current project 
focuses on the Hydrogen Kangoo which implies some technical choices in terms of tanks 
and HRS (350 bar) and indirectly for small HRS (because of low hydrogen volumes since 
the Hydrogen Kangoo is a hybrid). These options, relevant given the economic context, 
may actually make difficult our transition to sustainability (based on 700 bar and large 
HRS associated with high consumption volumes). It would be interesting to explore 
further the possible dead ends arising from these options and suggests possible ways to 
move along the lines suggested by scenario 2. This highlights the short term gains of 
scenario 1 and its potential long term risks. Alternatively a large deployment as expected 
in scenario 2, such as seems to be the case in Germany, would make the profitability of 
the early HRS deployment more risky while generating higher gains in the future. This 
would be worth exploring further a systematic year-by-year dynamic analysis.  
 
It would certainly also be worthwhile to explore this question more formally. Our analysis 
suggests that the two cost components (vehicle and fuel costs) involved in the 
deployment of FCEV could be formalized as follows. The vehicle cost component would 
involve learning by doing generating a decreasing unit cost over time. The fuel cost 
component would involve convexities generating an increasing marginal cost at any point 
                                                             
12 This is in line with Farrell, Keith and Corbett (2003), which suggested focusing the deployment on 
heavy duty freight modes.  
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of time. The dynamic interaction between these two components would be such that a 
lower vehicle cost generates a lower fuel cost and vice versa, the first effect being much 
stronger that the second one. It would be interesting to formalize further such a joint cost 
function and discuss its implication in terms of policies and deployment.   
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